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RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: THE
ROLE OF ABSTENTION AND RES JUDICATA
I. Introduction
During the last decade the United States Supreme Court has
limited the access of civil rights litigants to the federal courts
through expanded use of res judicatal and broadened application of
the doctrine of abstention.' These recent restrictions are contrary to
a history of expanding access which began about one hundred years
ago and climaxed during the 1960s.3
Res judicata is a common-law doctrine incorporated into our Con-
stitution by the "full faith and credit" clause.4 Abstention is a much
newer creation of the judicial branch of government.' This Com-
ment will describe how these doctrines limit the availability of the
federal forum to civil rights claimants who commence actions under
1. Res judicata is a common law doctrine which provides that a final judgment by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties in all later suits on matters
determined in the former suit. It is invoked when the cause of action and the parties are
identical. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
2. The original doctrine of abstention simply required a federal court to hold an action in
abeyance, if the meaning of a challenged state statute was ambiguous, giving the state court
an opportunity to interpret the meaning of its own laws before the litigation was resumed in
federal court. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Abstention has evolved
into a doctrine which may require a federal court to dismiss an action in favor of the state
court. See text accompanying notes 20-60 infra.
3. The civil rights laws enacted to support the fourteenth amendment after the Civil War
began the expansion. See, e.g., notes 6 & 7 infra. In 1961, the Supreme Court decided
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). That decision supported the policy of making federal
courts the forums for litigation of civil rights claims. The Court held that federal remedies in
civil rights actions are available to litigants regardless of whether state remedies are also
sought or obtained.
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof." Congress prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) that state
judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ....
5. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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sections 19816 and 19837 of Title 42 of the United States Code and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8
II. Origin and Development of the Abstention
Doctrine-Denial of Injunctive Relief
Historically, federal courts have refrained from enjoining pending
state criminal prosecutions because of federalism9 and adherence to
the maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution. 0 The
Anti-Injunction Statute of 1793" codified this principle of non-
interference with state criminal proceedings and forbade such inter-
vention. The Supreme Court eventually introduced some flexibility
into the doctrine in Ex Parte Young.'2 That decision permitted a
federal court to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state
statute when the litigant faced immediate and irreparable harm
from its operation. 3
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (Section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 144)
[hereinafter section 1981] provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13) [here-
inafter section 1983] provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) (pertinent section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
[hereinafter Title VIII) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice to refuse to hire
or to discharge or otherwise discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin,
or to limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants in any way which would deprive
them of employment opportunities or affect employee status because of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. Id.
9. The essence of federalism in this context is non-interference with the rights of the
separate states. See, e.g., Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1939).
Federal courts avoid enjoining state court proceedings to avoid "needless friction between
state and federal courts." Id. at 9.
10. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) for the history of this doctrine of
equitable restraint.
11. 1 Stat. 335 (1793). "[Njor shall such writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings
in any court of a state. ... Id. at 335.
12. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
13. Id.
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The Court carved out additional exceptions to the anti-injunction
doctrine through the years, as Congress enacted legislation which
required or allowed an injunction to issue." The modern general
rule, which Congress codified in 1948,1 prescribes specific excep-
tions to the prohibition against federal injunctiye relief.' One of
these exceptions permits injunctions when they are "expressly au-
thorized by Act of Congress."' 7 Section 1983 specifically permits
those deprived of their constitutional rights under color of state law
to bring an "action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress."'" In 1972 the Supreme Court held that these words had
"expressly authorized" injunctions in actions arising under section
1983.11
The abstention doctrine developed as a result of the tension be-
tween the principle of federal non-intervention in state proceedings
and the need of civil rights litigants for such interference when a
state infringed upon their constitutional rights.
The doctrine emerged in 1941 with the Supreme Court's holding
in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.20 A Texas Railroad Com-
mission order required sleeping cars to be supervised by Pullman
conductors, all of whom were white, rather than Pullman porters,
14. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234-38 (1972) for development of these excep-
tions.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments."
17. Id.
18. See note 7 supra.
19. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). A three-judge district court in Mitchum
refused injunctive relief to a bookshop owner, whose shop was ordered closed under a Florida
nuisance statute, holding that the relief sought in the section 1983 action did "not come under
any of the exceptions" to the anti-injunction statute. Id. at 228. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding only that the district court was "in error in holding that, because of the anti-
injunction statute, it was absolutely without power in this § 1983 action to enjoin a proceeding
pending in a state court. . . ..." Id. at 243.
The Mitchum holding was totally consistent with the purpose of section 1983 (to afford a
citizen relief against state deprivations) and the era which spawned the legislation. During
the Congressional debate on section 1983, Representative Lowe stated: "[RIecords of the
[state] tribunals are searched in vain for evidence of effective redress [of federally secured
rights] . . . .What less than this [Civil Rights Act of 1871] will afford an adequate
remedy?" CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374-76, cited in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
at 240 (1972).
20. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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all of whom were black. The railroad sought to enjoin enforcement
of the order, claiming denial of due process, since the conductors
were paid more than the porters. The porters intervened, alleging
denial of equal protection. A three-judge federal district court'
granted the injunction," but the Supreme Court, on direct appeal,
reversed. 23
The Court believed it was accommodating both state and federal
interests with this decision. Pullman held that the state court must
be given an opportunity to give a preliminary ruling on questions
of ambiguous state law, a ruling which might extinguish the federal
issue if the railroad commission order were overturned by the state
courts. The federal court would retain jurisdiction as fact-finder if
the federal issues remained viable.
More recent cases,24 decided on the basis of "comity," 5 have vir-
tually eliminated the federal courts as fact-finders in many types of
civil rights actions. These later decisions" have closed the doors of
the federal courthouses to many section 1983 claimants who seek
injunctive relief against pending state proceedings. In Younger v.
Harris27 the Burger Court overturned a Warren Court holding 8 that
abstention was not appropriate when the challenged state statute
was overbroad and restricted first amendment rights. The respon-
dent in Younger had been indicted in a California state court for
violating a state statute which imposed criminal sanctions for the
spoken or written advocacy of change through violence or terrorism.
He sued in federal district court to enjoin the state prosecution,
21. Until August 12, 1976, when it was repealed by 90 Stat. 1119, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970)
required that "[an . . .injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of
any State statute . . . shall not be granted by any district court . . . upon the ground of the
unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined
by a district court of three judges.
22. 312 U.S. at 498.
23. Direct appeal to the Supreme Court from three-judge district courts is provided in 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
24. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975);
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
25. "Comity" is defined as "a proper respect [by federal courts] for state functions."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44.
26. See note 24 supra.
27. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
28. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court held that the federal district
court should have enjoined pending prosecutions under Louisiana's "anti-subversion" laws,
where the laws were overbroad and prosecutions were maintained solely for harassment of
Negroes, causing them irreparable injury. Id.
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claiming that the state law inhibited his freedom of speech and was
thus unconstitutional. A three-judge district court found the Act
void for vagueness and enjoined the prosecution." The Supreme
Court reversed on two grounds: the principle of non-intervention by
courts of equity in criminal prosecutions; and the principle of com-
ity, or deference to the state's interests.
Such powerful state concerns, the Court held, should take preced-
ence over federal intervention unless the contemplated injury was
irreparable, great and immediate."° The Court found no such irre-
parable and immediate injury present in this action, because a de-
fense in state court would allow the defendant to raise his constitu-
tional claims, the prosecution was brought in good faith, and the
injury the defendant faced was merely "that incidental to every
''31criminal proceeding ... .
In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.32 the Supreme Court extended the
Younger principle to an Ohio civil nuisance proceeding. State offi-
cials, pursuant to a public nuisance statute, brought a state action
to close for one year a theatre which had exhibited obscene films.
The defendant theatre owner's successor, who obtained ownership
prior to the judgment, did not appeal through the state courts, but
rather filed a section 1983 action in federal district court, seeking
an injunction against enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional
statute. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional as
a prior restraint on free speech and enjoined execution of the state
court's judgment.13 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
nuisance proceeding was so closely "akin" 3 to a criminal proceeding
that the Younger doctrine should be extended to this type of civil
proceeding. The Court further held that a claimant must exhaust a
29. 401 U.S. at 40.
30. "A threat of this nature might be shown if the state criminal statute in question were
patently and flagrantly unconstitutional on its face. . . , or if there has been bad faith and
harassment-official lawlessness-in a statute's enforcement .. " 401 U.S. at 56 (Stewart,
J., concurring). For a discussion of federal restraint in subsequent criminal cases see Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See also, Maraist,
Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski,
48 Texas L. Rev. 535 (1970); Note, Federal Jurisdiction--Younger v. Harris: A Current
Appraisal of the Policy Against Federal Court Interference With State Court Proceedings, 21
De Paul L. Rev. 519 (1971).
31. 401 U.S. at 49, citing Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
32. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
33. Id. at 599.
34. Id. at 604.
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state's appellate remedies before resorting to the federal courts.35
The Court refused to extend its holding to apply to other types of
civil litigation," but a more recent decision, Juidice v. Vail,3" has
accomplished that result.
In Vail appellees were fined and imprisoned under a New York
contempt statute after repeatedly failing to pay private creditor
judgments levied against them. They brought a section 1983 action
in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the statutory contempt
procedures "on the ground that the procedures leading to imprison-
ment for contempt of court violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... ",38 The three-judge district court held 'the challenged
sections of New York's Judiciary Law unconstitutional on their face
and enjoined their operation. 9 On appeal, the Supreme Court did
not reach the constitutional question, holding that the district court
should have abstained on Younger grounds. Thus the Court ex-
tended the Younger principle of non-interference in state criminal
proceedings to this purely civil action, justifying its decision on the
importance of the state interests involved.'"
Vail is significant as a further restriction upon access to federal
courts, not only because it extends Younger to strictly civil proceed-
ings, but also because, as Justice Stevens pointed out, it was the
contempt proceedings themselves which were challenged. "[Since]
the federal remedy that appellees seek is protection against being
required to participate in an unconstitutional judicial proceed-
ing. . . [e]ven ultimate success in such a proceeding would not
protect them from the harm they seek to avoid. The challenged state
procedures . . . cannot themselves provide an adequate remedy for
the alleged federal wrong.""
Pullman" was the first judicial recognition of abstention. At that
time the doctrine merely required state interpretation of state law
prior to federal adjudication of federal issues. But the doctrine has
35. Id. at 609-10.
36. Id. at 607.
37. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
38. Id. at 330.
39. Id. at 331.
40. Id. at 338-39.
41. Id. at 340-41 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
42. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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taken a turn different from what the Pullman Court may have en-
visaged.
The Younger Court held, in its eight to one decision, that a crimi-
nal defendant's "constitutional contentions may be adequately ad-
judicated in the state criminal proceeding,"43 but the Court declined
to "express [a] . . .view about the circumstances under which
federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state
courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun."" Presumably,
Younger would permit a relitigation in a section 1983 federal action
after state appeals have been exhausted, even though the defendant
would not be allowed to bring a 1983 action during the course of the
state proceedings.
Huffman reiterated the Younger reasoning, extending abstention,
by its six to three majority, to apply to civil nuisance proceedings,
and asserting that "entitlement [to a federal forum] is most appro-
priately asserted by a state litigant when he seeks to relitigate a
federal issue adversely determined in completed state court pro-
ceedings." 5 But the Court added: "We in no way intend to suggest
that there is a right of access to a federal forum for the disposition
of all federal issues, or that the normal rules of res judicata and
judicial estoppel do not operate to bar relitigation in actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 of federal issues arising in state court proceed-
ings.""6 Here, in addition to extending abstention to a civil proceed-
ing allegedly "akin"" to a criminal proceeding, the Court cast doubt
on the permissibility of a litigant's raising his constitutional claim
in federal court, even after abstention has forced him to exhaust
state remedies.
Neither Younger nor Huffman challenged the permissibility of
federal litigation of federal claims which had not been raised in state
court. But the five to four majority in Vail appears to have done just
that, in addition to extending abstention to a purely civil proceed-
ing. In Vail, the constitutional claims were never raised in the state
courts. Indeed, the civil defendants did not even appear in state
court, as it was the state court proceedings themselves that they
43. 401 U.S. 37, 56-57 (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 41.
45. 420 U.S. 592, 606 (1975) (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 606 n.18.
47. See note 34 supra.
1978]
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were attempting to challenge in federal court. The Supreme Court
nevertheless held that the federal district court could not entertain
a section 1983 action when the constitutional issues "could have
been raised . . . in the state courts, as a defense to the ongoing
proceedings. '4 8 "Here. . . appellees had an opportunity to present
their federal claims in the state proceedings. No more is required to
invoke Younger abstention.''"
Thus, through Younger and its progeny, an approach far different
from Pullman abstention has developed. It is really a new doctrine
and might be termed abdication rather than abstention. The
Younger line of decisions promotes, and may even require, elimina-
tion of the federal fact-finding role in civil rights cases, rather than
the mere delay required by Pullman abstention.
Once state courts have decided factual issues, the convicted crim-
inal defendant may still resort to federal habeas corpus relief,5 but
the civil defendant who has a federal claim may be deprived totally
of a federal fact-finding forum.8 Upon issuance of a plaintiff's sum-
mons, the civil defendant becomes a party to the state action and
must defend in the state court system, federal claims notwithstand-
ing. A defendant may not remove a state action to federal court for
adjudication of the federal question because the federal court will
abstain.
A civil plaintiff is in a better position, since he may institute his
action in federal court. Nonetheless, abstention can create problems
for him. In England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners" plaintiff chiropractors challenged in federal court a
Louisiana statute, alleging that its requirements barred them from
practicing within the state. They sought an injunction against en-
48. 430 U.S. at 330 (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 337 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
50. The habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970), provides that a federal court may
grant the writ to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal statutes or treaties,
and only after he shall have exhausted state remedies. Id. § 2254(a). The Supreme Court's
decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), discussed in the text accompanying notes
111-12 infra, has narrowed the availability of habeas corpus.
51. Justice Brennan disagreed with this turn of events. "It stands the § 1983 remedy on
its head to deny the § 1983 plaintiff access to the federal forum because of the pendency of
state civil proceedings where Congress intended that the district court should entertain his
suit without regard to the pendency of the state suit." Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 343 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
52. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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forcement of the statute as violative of the fourteenth amendment.
The three-judge district court abstained" and ruled that plaintiffs
must first seek a state court determination as to whether the Act
applied to chiropractors.
Plaintiffs then misconstrued a previous Supreme Court holding,
Government Employees v. Windsor,54 which required only that
plaintiffs inform a state court what their constitutional challenges
were. Plaintiffs erroneously thought that, following abstention, they
were required to litigate fully both their state and federal claims in
state court. After all their claims were rejected in state court, the
England plaintiffs returned to the federal court. The federal court,
however, dismissed the action and held that because the federal
question had been submitted and ruled upon by the state court, the
proper remedy was by appeal through the state courts to the Su-
preme Court.55
Because of the misunderstanding as to the prior Windsor holding,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of the constitutional claim. In addition, it clarified
the earlier holding, stating that, following abstention, a party must
inform a state court what his federal claims are, but he need not
litigate them in state court; he may reserve his right to return to
federal court either by express reservation or by clear indication that
he did not voluntarily and fully litigate his federal claims in the
state proceeding."
A reservation of rights enables a plaintiff to return to federal
court, but difficulties remain. First, he must be aware of these tech-
nicalities; and second, he must have a "deep pocket." "Many
[litigants] . . . can hardly afford one lawsuit, let alone two. Shut-
tling the parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure way
of defeating the ends of justice. . . .There are no foundations to
finance the resolution of nice state law questions involved in federal
court litigation." 57
53. Id. at 413.
54. 353 U.S. 364 (1957). Windsor held that a party had to inform a state court what his
federal claims were so that the state court might interpret the state statute with consideration
of any constitutional objections. It was interpreted by some to require that a party actually
litigate his federal claims in the state court proceeding. See discussion of Windsor in England,
375 U.S. at 419-20.
55. 375 U.S. at 414.
56. Id. at 420.
57. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (Douglas, J., dissenting), cited
1978]
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Even the financially stable civil plaintiff could face further diffi-
culties if he is later named a defendant under a state criminal stat-
ute. According to Hicks v. Miranda, 5 s a civil rights plaintiff, who has
already filed an action in federal court challenging the constitution-
ality of a state criminal statute, may be forced to defend against
state criminal proceedings which are commenced after the federal
claim, as long as proceedings on the merits have not yet begun in
federal court." Thus the Supreme Court, by further extension of
Younger, has sanctioned the conversion of a federal civil plaintiff
into a state criminal defendant. The only requirement is that state
officials reach the state courthouse before litigation on the merits
commences in the federal district court. Justice Stewart, dissenting
from the five to four majority in Hicks, declared: "Today's opinion
virtually instructs state officials to answer federal complaints with
state indictments. Today, the State must file a criminal charge to
secure dismissal of the federal litigation; . . . and the day may not
be far off when any state civil action will do.""0
III. Uses and Misuses of the Doctrine of Res Judicata
Res judicatall derives from article IV, section 1 of the United
States Constitution 2 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738.3 Section 1738 requires
that the judicial proceedings of any court in the United States be
accorded full faith and credit in any other court. Problems arise for
the civil rights litigant when a state court adjudicates a federal
claim which he would prefer to litigate in federal court. "Full faith"
may preclude relitigation in the federal forum."4
in England, 375 U.S. at 425 (Douglas, J., concurring). The shuttling back and forth caused
the England case to continue for seven years before a decision on the merits was reached. Id.
at 426.
58. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
59. Id. Miranda owned a theatre which was exhibiting the film "Deep Throat." Copies of
the film were confiscated under a state obscenity statute and misdemeanor charges were filed
against two employees. Miranda filed an action in district court to enjoin enforcement of the
statute. One day after service of the federal complaint was completed, a criminal complaint
pending in state court was amended to include the federal plaintiffs as defendants. The three-
judge district court found the state statute unconstitutional and refused to abstain since the
federal court had jurisdiction before the state court. The Supreme Court reversed and ex-
tended Younger on principles of comity.
60. 422 U.S. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
61. See definition in note 1 supra.
62. See note 4 supra.
63. Id.
64. See Torke, Res Judicata in Federal Civil Rights Actions Following State Litigation, 9
490 [Vol. VI
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A recent Second Circuit case, Mitchell v. National Broadcasting
Co., 5 illustrates some of the problems that emerge when res judicata
is invoked. After N.B.C. discharged Blanche Mitchell from her
employment, she filed a complaint with the New York State Divi-
sion of Human Rights,"6 alleging racial discrimination. After investi-
gation, the state authority dismissed the complaint for lack of prob-
able cause. Plaintiff appealed to the State Human Rights Appeal
Board 7 and shortly thereafter filed a complaint with the federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), following
the rules prescribed under Title VIVI The State Appeal Board split
two to two, automatically affirming dismissal of the state com-
plaint, and the Appellate Division 9 of the New York State Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed. Plaintiff did not appeal to New York's
highest court. Sometime later the EEOC found no probable cause
for the federal complaint and issued a right-to-sue letter,70 entitling
the plaintiff to bring an action in federal court under Title VII.
Instead, she commenced an action under another civil rights stat-
ute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,7" which guarantees to all persons the same
rights to make and enforce contracts as those "enjoyed by white
citizens."7 The federal district court held that the claim was res
judicata and dismissed the suit.7" The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the parties and the rights
adjudicated in the state proceeding were identical to those of the
section 1981 action. Therefore, said the court, the federal claims had
Ind. L. Rev. 543 (1976) for a full discussion of these problems.
65. 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977).
66. New York State law provides that any person aggrieved by an alleged discriminatory
practice may file a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights, which will make a
prompt investigation of the matter. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(1) (McKinney 1972).
67. The Appeal Board hears appeals by any party from all orders of the commission. N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 297-a(6)(c) (McKinney 1972).
68. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which created the EEOC, requires that when
an unlawful employment practice occurs within a state which has its own laws prohibiting
the practice, proceedings must first be commenced under the state or local law, and a claim
be made to the EEOC sixty days after such commencement. The intent is to allow the state
the first opportunity to resolve the dispute under its own laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)
-5(d) (1970).
69. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 298 (McKinney 1972) directs that appeals from the Appeal Board
be heard by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970) provides for the issuance of such a letter.
71. See note 6 supra for text of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
72. Id.
73. 553 F.2d at 268.
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a fair adjudication under the analogous New York State law,7" and
the state court's determination was binding upon the federal court.
The Mitchell decision raises grave problems. Title VII's deferral
provision" required complainant Mitchell to seek state administra-
tive remedies before the EEOC could consider her claim. After ad-
ministrative rejection, plaintiff invoked the normal channels of
state judicial review for a claim begun under Title VII. The Second
Circuit, however, interpreted the deferral provision to mean that
only state administrative action, and not state judicial review,
might be sought if a complainant intended to revert to a federal
remedy. 6 Since plaintiff Mitchell received a judicial decision (dis-
missal by the appellate division) in state court, the federal court
held it res judicata. In declining jurisdiction on these grounds, the
court actually held a state court decision rendered under a state
statute to bar a federal claim under a federal statute, a result which
Congress did not intend.77
This presents an anomalous situation: a plaintiff is forced by the
provisions of Title VII to seek state remedies first; but if he appeals
a hearing officer's determination in the state's prescribed statutory
manner (i.e., state courts), he has lost his right to sue in the federal
forum.
Congress intended federal civil rights remedies to be separate and
distinct from any state remedy.78 Although Title VII requires that a
litigant first employ available state machinery, Congress did not
intend to deprive a civil rights litigant of his federal remedies if a
state agency or court rendered a decision against him.7" Numerous
federal courts of appeals, including the Second Circuit, have held
that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in such cases.80 "The
74. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [flor an employer. . .. because
of the age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability, or marital status of any
individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such
individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.
Id.
75. See note 68 supra.
76. Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265, 275 (1977).
77. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). "The federal remedy is supplementary
to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked." Id. See also text accompanying notes 78-80 infra.
78. See note 77 supra.
79. Id. See note 80 and accompanying text infra.
80. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir.), cert.
[Vol. VI
1978] ABSTENTION AND RES JUDICATA
federal remedy is independent and cumulative... , and its facili-
tates comprehensive relief."'"
Even if res judicata were technically applicable, Judge Feinberg
points out in his Mitchell dissent that "strong federal policies can
override the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 [full faith and credit]
. . . .Such a strong, countervailing federal policy is involved in this
case. With respect to employment discrimination, Congress has
shown a clear intent to provide injured plaintiffs with a federal fact-
finding forum .. ,"I' and this intent supersedes any requirements
of section 1738.13
The second difficulty in the Mitchell decision is that its rationale
effectively eliminates the use of Title VII, under which plaintiff
Mitchell initiated her complaint. This is unfortunate, since Title
VII promotes conciliation rather than litigation.8" An informed
plaintiff, faced with both the deferral provisions of Title VII and a
Mitchell application of res judicata, would probably utilize section
1981, since it does not require prior state proceedings. He would
thereby forego any possibility of Title VII conciliation and frustrate
the Congressional intent that civil rights remedies be complemen-
tary rather than exclusive. 5
denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1976); Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1974); Long v. Ford
Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Batiste v. Furnco Const. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); Benneci v. New York State Div. of Employ-
ment, 388 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
81. Veutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 893 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 918 (1972).
82. Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265, 277 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
83. Id. Accord, American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(4) (1970). The primary role of the EEOC is to achieve
voluntary compliance by informal means.
85. "[R]emedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the
individual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
.. .the two procedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive." H.R. Rep. No.
92-238, at 19 (1971), cited in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459
(1975). At least two recent Supreme Court decisions have upheld the supplementary nature
of federal remedies in civil rights actions. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), held that an arbitration hearing held under a nondiscrimination clause of a collective
bargaining agreement, which ruled that the petitioner was fired for just cause, did not fore-
close a judicial remedy under Title VII because "[tihe clear inference is that Title VII was
designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to
employment discrimination." Id. at 48-49. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454 (1975), held that filing under Title VII did not toll the running of the statute of limita-
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Title VII and section 1981 are different actions and indeed provide
different remedies."8 A minority of courts have held that a Title VII
action must be pursued before institution of a section 1981 action,"7
but the majority agree that "Title VII and 1981 afford different
tactical advantages and handicaps to aggrieved parties," ' so that
either one may be sought before the other or they may proceed
concurrently, and one civil rights action could not then be res
judicata of another.8
Another decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Winters
v. Lavine, ° illustrates the tightrope upon which a civil rights liti-
gant may be placed by application of res judicata principles to state
court determinations of federal issues.
After the appropriate New York City and State administrative
departments refused Miriam Winters' claim for Medicaid reim-
bursement for payments to a Christian Science nurse, she appealed
in the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on two
grounds: (1) violation of the statutes governing such reimburse-
ment; and (2) deprivation of her constitutional right to free exercise
of religion. The appellate division ruled against the plaintiff with-
out any mention of the constitutional issue or any indication of
whether it had considered that claim.' The New York Court of
tions applicable to section 1981 because the two remedies are "separate, distinct and inde-
pendent," id. at 461, and "both remedies are available to victims of discriminatory prac-
tices." Id. at 468 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86. For instance, Title VII claimants may be awarded back pay, but not for more than
two years prior to filing with the EEOC, while section 1981 claimants are not bound by the
two year limitation; section 1981 applies to all employers, while Title VII excludes some; Title
VII offers investigation, conciliation, even attorneys' fees, while section 1981 does not. See
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 459-60.
87. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvesters Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
88. Long v. Ford Motor Co., .496 F.2d 500, 504, n. .7 (6th Cir. 1974).
89. Congress has "long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
90. 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978).
91. The appellate division stated:
Aside from the fact that a Christian Science nurse is not classified as a registered nurse
(Education Law § 6901 et seq.), petitioner has not demonstrated that she is entitled
to payments pursuant to Social Services Law § 365-a, since there is insufficient
[evidence] in the record to indicate either the nature of her illness or the treatment
which she received.
Winters v. Comm'r of State Dep't of Social Services, 49 App. Div. 2d 843, 844, 373 N.Y.S.2d
604, 605 (1st Dep't 1975), appeal dismissed, 39 N.Y.2d 832, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1029, appeal dis-
missed & cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1011 (1976).
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Appeals dismissed an appeal as of right, holding there was "no sub-
stantial constitutional question directly involved.""
In a later section 1981 action brought in federal court,9" the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals held" that the New York Court of
Appeals decision was res judicata as to the constitutional question
presented, despite the fact that no express inquiry into the merits
of that question had been made in either the intermediate or the
highest state court.
The federal court came to its decision through its application of
what it called the "New York rule" of collateral estoppel 5 (a corol-
lary to res judicata) which "bars the relitigation of any issue...
which was litigated and decided against the litigant in the earlier
action, provided that the resolution of the issue . . . [was] neces-
sary to the [earlier] judgment . . . ,." Contrary to the appellant's
claim that there had been no decision on the merits upon which to
apply any exclusionary principle, the Second Circuit held that, (1)
since the appellate division's rejection of the constitutional claim
was necessary to its judgment,' its silence on the matter must be
deemed a rejection sub silentiol" and was therefore a ruling on the
merits, and (2) although dismissal by the highest state court was a
failure to rule on the merits of the constitutional question, the dis-
92. 574 F.2d at 51.
93. The action named as defendants the commissioners of the state and city Departments
of Social Services. Plaintiff's principal claim was that the New York Medicaid statute was
unconstitutional because it denied plaintiff her free exercise of religion. Judge Bartels deter-
mined that the constitutional question required the convening of a three-judge court, but the
three-judge court held her claim for payment barred by res judicata, because of its rejection
by the New York Court of Appeals. See note 92 supra. Plaintiff Winters appealed directly
to the United States Supreme Court, which ordered the vacating of the district court's
judgment and rendering of a fresh decree, so that an appeal might be taken to the federal
court of appeals. Winters v. Lavine, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). The district court complied with a
fresh decree adhering to its original decision, and plaintiff appellant appealed to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals on February 18, 1977.
94. 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978).
95. Id. at 58.
96. Id. at 56. The federal law of res judicata, according to the court's opinion, is harmo-
nious with the "New York rule" of collateral estoppel, id. at 58; that is, an issue may be
barred in later litigation only if it was raised and litigated in the earlier action. The so-called
"New York rule" of res judicata bars relitigation of any issue that could have been litigated
in the prior action. The court consciously chose to apply collateral estoppel, which it called
the "conservative position," id. at 56-57, rather than res judicata.
97. Id. at 60-61.
98. Id. at 61.
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missal was justified because appellant had no right of appeal," and
therefore, the appellate division's decision was a final one.'00 Thus
the court of appeals collaterally estopped a "relitigation" in federal
court of a constitutional claim that had never actually been consid-
ered by the state courts. The disharmony between the legal princi-
ples set out by the federal court and the matters which had been
considered by the state courts illustrates one of the most severe
dangers facing a civil rights plaintiff, the danger of having no forum
consider the merits of the constitutional issue.
IV. Effect of Abstention and Res Judicata upon Litigants
Clearly, a civil rights claimant will not always gain access to
federal court.' Thus, it might be helpful to explore in depth the
problems he may face in attempting to litigate his federal claims.
A. The Criminal Defendant
Since a federal court will not interfere in a pending state criminal
prosecution, 02 where can the defendant seek adjudication of a sec-
tion 1983 claim' 3 alleging that the statute under which he is being
prosecuted is unconstitutional?
He can, of course, allege immediate and irreparable harm, in
order to obtain injunctive relief, on the basis of that exception to the
Anti-Injunction Statute.'4 Even though the Supreme Court has
held that section 1983 expressly authorizes injunctive relief,' 05 the
Court's narrow construction of that provision' 0 gives the defendant
little hope for such relief.
99. Id. at 62. "If the decision [of the appellate division] has or may have been based
on some other ground, the appeal will not lie." Id. The other ground, the court believed, was
the insufficiency of plaintiff's evidence that she was entitled to Medicaid payments. Id. at
63. See note 91 supra.
This contradicts the court's first holding that consideration of the constitutional claim had
been necessary to the appellate division's decision. Clearly it was not necessary if its decision
was based on evidentiary grounds.
100. Id. at 62.
101. See parts II & III supra and cases cited therein.
102. See text accompanying notes 9 and 10 supra.
103. Section 1983 is used only as a hypothetical. The problem attaches to all such civil
rights actions.
104. See text accompanying notes 12 and 13 supra.
105. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
106. The Court has used the restrictive Younger doctrine to justify abstention, despite the
Mitchum holding.
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The criminal defendant has two other choices. He may raise the
constitutional claim as a defense in his criminal prosecution, and
risk that he will be collaterally estopped 1 from relitigating that
issue in a federal forum; or he may withhold his constitutional
claim, reserving it for a possible federal court action, but thereby
take a greater risk of conviction on the original charges in state
court. 108
If the defendant unsuccessfully litigates his constitutional claim
in the state courts, he may seek redress through federal habeas
corpus, 1" in order to have the claim adjudicated de novo in federal
court. But even this last resort to the long-established writ"0 may
be denied the defendant. In 1976 the Supreme Court refused habeas
corpus relief to two criminal defendants, convicted by allegedly un-
lawfully seized evidence,"' holding that habeas corpus was not
available in fourth amendment cases where the state had "pro-
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation""' of the federal
claim in the state courts.
The implications for a criminal defendant with a civil rights claim
are troublesome. If this 1976 holding is extended to other constitu-
tional guarantees, the defendant's last opportunity for a federal
forum may fade away. Since a convicted criminal defendant has
been deprived of his liberty, he most deserves preservation of his
right to a federal forum.
This new limitation on habeas corpus may have a reverse effect
upon some federal court judges who have collaterally estopped sec-
tion 1983 actions, knowing that the defendant could always seek his
federal forum via habeas corpus. As district court Judge Merhige
stated in Moran v. Mitchell,"' "[T]his Court has some doubt as to
the propriety of collateral estoppel in this context (section 1983
action), at least in those instances where the criminal defendant is
unable to secure consideration of his constitutional claims through
107. Principles of res judicata will be invoked to estop any collatbral relitigation of his
claim in another court.
108. Some federal courts have voiced concern over this problem. See Moran v. Mitchell,
354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973); Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971).
109. See note 50 supra.
110. The authority of federal courts in this country to issue the writ of habeas corpus dates
back to the Judiciary Act of 1789.
111. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
112. Id. at 494.
113. 354 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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federal habeas corpus .... [1In the majority of criminal convic-
tions [however], federal habeas corpus is available to the defen-
dant to assert his federal claims free of res judicata or collateral
estoppel defenses.""' Only time will tell whether such feelings will
serve to reopen the federal courthouse doors.
B. The Civil Defendant
Finding a federal forum for a defendant in a state civil action is
also difficult. By the mere issuance of a summons, he is made party
to an action in state court. If the summons is issued under an uncon-
stitutional state statute, his civil rights are infringed at the same
moment that he becomes a defendant, and he is thereby a captive
of the state court system.
The defendant may want to assert the unconstitutionality of the
statute. If he tries to file in federal court or remove there on a
counterclaim, he faces abstention in the Younger sense, which may
really be dismissal in favor of the state court."' He may not be able
to obtain federal injunctive relief unless his injury is irreparable,
great and immediate,"' even though he is a civil defendant. He is
in a worse procedural straitjacket than the criminal defendant,
since the civil defendant does not even have a right to seek habeas
corpus relief. He may be totally without access to a federal forum.
C. The Civil Plaintiff
The civil rights plaintiff is in the best position initially to secure
a federal forum since he has the right to choose one under sections
1981 and 1983."1 If the court feels that there are issues requiring
state interpretation and adjudication, it will abstain, but the plain-
tiff may reserve his federal claims via the England procedure"' and
return to federal court for their litigation. He must be careful, how-
ever, not to appear to have litigated his federal claims in state court,
because that will bar his return to federal court.
If a plaintiff in a section 1983 action believes that a criminal
statute, which may ultimately affect him, is unconstitutional and
seeks injunctive or declaratory relief in federal court, he too may
114. Id. at 88-89.
115. See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
116. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
117. Title VII requires exhaustion of state remedies first. See note 68 supra.
118. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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become locked into the state system. The state could bring a crimi-
nal proceeding under the questioned statute, and if the state did so
before federal proceedings on the merits had commenced, the fed-
eral court would yield to the state court, even though the federal
action was instituted first. Thus, the claimant would have lost his
federal fact-finding forum."'
V. Why a Federal Forum?
Proponents of keeping federal claims in state courts cite judicial
economy, comity and termination of litigation as their rationale.
But the reasons supporting the litigation of federal claims in federal
courts are far more compelling.
A. Congressional Intent
Congress has given federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims aris-
ing under federal law.' Congress also has enacted legislation giving
the federal courts original jurisdiction over civil rights actions., 2'
Moreover, certain federal civil rights statutes specifically provide
for federal court jurisdiction. 22 Legislative history evinces a Con-
gressional intent to make federal remedies available in civil rights
cases. 23 While repealing the requirement that three federal judges
119. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); see also notes 59 & 60 and accompanying
text supra.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. 1977) in pertinent part provides:, "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions . . . (which arise) under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person:
(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the
deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done
in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing
any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about
to occur and power to prevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Consti-
tution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
122. For Instance, Title VII provides for the right to sue in federal court. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. §§ 1975d(g), 1988 (1970).
123. See notes 77-86 and accompanying text supra.
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decide the constitutionality of state statutes,' Congress left intact
both the power and the duty of the federal district court to make
such determinations. 2' All of these actions indicate that Congress
intends civil rights litigants to have their day in federal court.
B. Availability of Habeas Corpus Review
For those deprived of their liberty, the opportunity to litigate
constitutional claims in federal court has always been available.",
The Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell' gives finality to
state court determinations as to violations of the fourth amend-
ment rights of criminal defendants, and precludes habeas corpus
review when there has been "full and fair litigation' 2 8 of such
claims in the state courts.
Yet, in the very cases' 2' leading to this landmark decision, habeas
corpus had been granted, and both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
had found that the state courts had denied the defendants their
fourth amendment rights. 30
While neither state nor federal courts are infallible, their lack of
agreement illustrates how important a second look at the facts
might be for a person facing long-term confinement, or even death.
C. Political Considerations
There are still some occasions when the impartiality of the federal
court system, its removal from local government and local politics,
gives it power that the state courts are unable to wield.
In Rizzo v. Goode"'3 a federal district court ordered injunctive
relief and development of a remedial program to end an unconstitu-
tionally pervasive pattern of police brutality against minority citi-
zens of Philadelphia. 3 2 The Third Circuit affirmed, 3 3 but the Su-
preme Court reversed, basing its decision in part on the inappro-
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976).
125. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2283, 2284 (1970).
126. See note 110 supra.
127. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
128. See note 112 supra.
129. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir.
1974).
130. Id.
131. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
132. 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
133. 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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priateness of federal intervention into local state activities.'34 Plain-
tiffs were left to their state remedies, and the same abusive pattern
of police activity continued.'35
In this type of civil rights action federal intervention can be a
strong tool in restoring rights to the aggrieved parties.
D. State Interest
It may be in the state's best interests to have civil rights claims
processed in federal court, particularly when a section 1983 claim
arises in a civil action between private parties.13
If the State may not be heard in the state civil case, defense of the constitu-
tionality of its statute would be solely in the hands of a party having neither
the State's resources, expertise, nor governmental interest in sustaining the
validity of .the statute . . . . [Tihe state must choose whether to intervene
in countless private lawsuits brought all over the State . . . or . . . risk
adverse decisions having effects far beyond the interests of the particular
private parties. By contrast, a 1983 suit in federal court necessarily names
the State or its officials as defendants, and the litigation focuses squarely on
the issue of the validity of the statute, with the State defending its own
interest directly."7
E. Expense
It is expensive for a civil rights litigant, civil or criminal, to pursue
his claim through tiers of state courts, when a federal court refuses
to enjoin, or abstains. The convening of a district court, which now
requires only a single judge, 3 and the issuance of an injunction or
declaratory judgment, could end the proceedings early. Equitable
restraint by federal courts may result in two or three extra rounds
of appeals and consequent financial hardship to the litigant. Many
who are deprived of their rights in the first instance are also de-
prived of justice in the second instance because of economic inabil-
ity to sustain multiple litigation. 3 '
134. 423 U.S. at 379-80.
135. See Philadelphia is Resistant in Police Brutality Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1977,
at A-13, col. 3. In July, 1977 a group of Philadelphia clergy wrote to President Carter concern-
ing the continuing policy brutality and failure of local officials to do anything about it. Id. at
col. 5.
136. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), was a civil action between private parties. See
text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
137. Id. at 345-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2281, requiring three judges, was repealed on August 12, 1976.
139. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 425-26 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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VI. Conclusion
The federal court system bears a large and increasing case load.
The Supreme Court and other federal courts undoubtedly feel that
some of this burden should shift to the states."' Effects of the bur-
densome case load upon civil rights litigants were reflected in re-
sponses to a survey on the Supreme Court conducted by U.S. News
& World Report."' As one unnamed attorney commented, "Where
the Court has been required to balance the interests of litigants
seeking to vindicate constitutional and other federally protected
rights against the legitimate concern over increasing case loads in
the federal courts, the Court has regularly favored the latter interest
by denying litigants access to the federal forums.""'
Diversity cases"' now comprise 26% of civil filings in district
courts."' In order to diminish the case load, a shift of diversity cases
from federal to state courts, long endorsed by Chief Justice
Burger,' would' be a far lighter blow to basic rights than non-
uniform and often arbitrary denial of the federal forum when impor-
tant federal questions are at issue, and particularly questions of civil
rights. It is up to Congress, however, to institute such a change.
Until Congress does act, the simplest and perhaps most just solu-
tion the federal courts can provide to the civil rights litigants would
be judicial refusal to apply res judicata to federal claims adjudi-
cated in state courts. In other words, the numerous statutes granting
federal forums for federal issues should predominate over the stat-
ute granting full faith and credit. While this would not ease the
economic hardship of multiple litigation, it would eliminate the
sometimes incongruous and unjust results of the combination of
140. See reports and speeches of Chief Justice Burger including: Year-End Reports on the
Judiciary, January 3, 1976 and January 2, 1977; Keynote Address at National Conference on
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, April 7, 1976;
Annual Address to the American Bar Association on the State of the Judiciary, February 15,
1976.
141. Burger v. Warren, Whose Court is Better?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, March 7,
1977, at 58-67.
142. Id. at 63.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (Supp. 1977) provides federal court jurisdiction for controversies
between citizens of different states (i.e. diversity jurisdiction).
144. See Statement of Robert J. Sheran, Chief Judge of the Minnesota Supreme Court,
The State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice, delivered to the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, July 28, 1977.
145. See note 140 supra.
[Vol. VI
1978] ABSTENTION AND RES JUDICATA 503
abstention and res judicata, the race to the courthouse to make a
federal court plaintiff into a state court defendant, and the loss of
the federal forum on technicality or misinterpretation.
Irma B. Ascher

